Josep Borrell, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, recently* spoke at the inauguration of the Ventotene seminar. He was taking part in the relaunching of the action committee for the United States of Europe — and seeking fresh impetus for the most intense weeks of his term: the ones that will define his political legacy. Then, the Spanish Socialist will make way for the Estonian hawk Kaja Kallas, who will take office (not before October) with the rest of the new Commission.

Despite Borrell's vigorous temperament, this role has required him to patiently nurture relations between the Commission and (often divided) governments, in order to pull the strings of a common European foreign policy. On Gaza, the «unity is less than on Ukraine». But he has not abandoned the idea of EU sanctions against violent settlers and extremist Israeli ministers. As for the peace conference so desired by Spain, the high representative formulates a j'accuse: the Netanyahu government has «no political will» for this to happen. Thus Borrell leaves at least one thing certain: continued support for Ukraine, despite the prospect of possible American betrayals, and in spite of «non-cooperative players» such as Orbán's Hungary.

After many months of war in Gaza and its impact on the Middle East, given the ongoing massacre of civilians (including journalists) and the humanitarian crisis, do you consider the EU reaction strong enough, or are divisions among member states limiting its impact?

It is obvious that the degree of European unity achieved on this conflict is not the same as, say, with Putin’s aggression against Ukraine. The nature of the conflict is also different, with Hamas’s initial despicable terrorist attack on Israel. There are also historical reasons related to the tragic experience of the Holocaust in Europe that explain certain national positions. Having said that, as difficult as it may be, we need to increase our unity on this topic because Israel’s right to defend itself must be proportionate and in line with International Law, including Humanitarian Law.

We urgently need to stop the killing of civilians, and the spread of disease (polio), with a permanent ceasefire, which could also help the liberation of the more than one hundred Israeli citizens still captive as hostages, and to relaunch the peace process. On this, we have a common EU position.

Will we see sanctions against the Israeli government during your mandate?

Well, I have already on 16 August proposed sanctions against violent settlers in the West Bank, I just proposed to the Foreign Affairs Council on 29 August sanctions against two Israeli Ministers for their hate messages. As always, the decision requires unanimity and it is in the hands of the ministers. But the proposal is on the table and the discussion has just started.

The Spanish government pushed for a peace conference, and the Council approved it. Where are we at with this, now?

I proposed already back in January a ten-point peace plan to end the conflict and achieve a comprehensive settlement. This of course includes the peace conference. For that to happen, we need first the ceasefire, probably also, a new administration in Gaza not controlled by Hamas, and most importantly, an Israeli government politically willing to engage on the basis of the two-state solution. Right now, these conditions are not in place, and I am afraid that the most difficult one is the third.

The last Foreign Affairs Council was held in Brussels instead of Budapest. Apart from initiatives in moral persuasion, do you think EU leaders and EU Commission should take further, effective initiatives (postponing the presidency, pushing for overcoming the unanimity rule, freezing more funds, etc.) to counteract the Hungarian prime minister’s ties with Vladimir Putin? (Not only meetings in Moscow, but also the visa issue, the oil issue, Paks 2…).

Well, the Hungarian Council Presidency cannot be postponed, it is already happening, although it is developing in a peculiar way to say the least. I was very clear in denouncing Orbán´s visit to Moscow and the consequence has been the one you mentioned, I decided not to organise the informal Council on Foreign Affairs in Budapest. My colleague Johansson has requested explanations on the visa program for Russians. On Paks 2, it seems there is compliance with Euratom rules under certain conditions, but of course the undertaking of common nuclear projects with Russia is against our current foreign policy. We can say the same on the oil question: there is a legally approved exception for Hungary and Slovakia but it is certainly not helpful for the overall goal that we want to achieve, which is to end whatever kind of financing of Putin´s war machine. Indeed, we have a problem with the unanimity rule, particularly when you have non-cooperative players often aligned with hostile powers. We have to consider alternatives, if not the use of qualified majority vote, at least a supermajority rule, let’s say a four-fifths majority, so just one or two countries cannot block everything.

How would Trump’s victory change the EU’s approach to defence and its role in the Ukrainian scenario? When the US administration left Afghanistan, the EU paid the price of instability. Do we risk being left alone in Ukraine too?

We still have not heard Trump’s explanation of his magic formula to “end the war in Ukraine” in 24 hours. In Spain, we say that if you want miracles, go to Lourdes, a Catholic site of pilgrimage in France. I am indeed afraid that he may just want to end US support to Ukraine, if elected. So, there is a risk. Obviously, a future Harris administration would be much more in line with current EU policy. Will see what happens in the election; it is not in our hands, really. What it is in our hands is to develop our industrial base for defence and build our own European Defence Union, just in case, which is what I proposed in the Strategic Compass. Besides, Ukraine is not Afghanistan: we do not depend entirely on the US. We will continue to support Ukraine in any event: let´s not forget, it is an EU candidate.

What do you consider to be your greatest political legacy as a high representative, and what do you imagine you will do next?

Well, this is for others to judge. If I must pick one only, I will go for support to Ukraine, with the first ever mobilisation of the European Peace Facility to provide weapons to a third country at war, our EU military training mission, the fourteen packages of sanctions, agreed by unanimity, and the use of Russian frozen assets to defend and rebuild Ukraine. Also, the approval of the Rapid Deployment Capacity of 5,000 soldiers, proposed in the Strategic Compass.

Spain, the country you come from, has remained one of the few socialist bastions in the EU, and it is likely that the future EU Commission will also reflect this balance shifted to the right. France is facing a political crisis, Germany’s SPD will face complicated elections this weekend*, Italy is governed by the far right. Should we resign ourselves to an EU shifted to the right, or do you envisage progressives taking the lead? How?

Certainly, with the elections to the European Parliament, the center of gravity has shifted to the right, with gains for EPP but also for the far right, albeit less than expected. In fact, the pro-EU parties will remain in control. Social democrats have barely maintained their numbers in the Parliament but have lost positions in the Council. I believe we socialists cannot resign ourselves to be permanently the second party in Europe. We need to tackle head on the worries of the popular classes, something the far right has been more effective on, even if with no real or acceptable solutions: migration, depopulation, deindustrialization, agriculture...

You have just travelled to Ventotene, the stronghold of European federalism. How does Altiero Spinelli’s Manifesto still inspire your action, and how should it concretely inspire the EU?

The Ventotene Manifesto remains a reference because already in 1941, in the middle of the Second World War, it provided the vision of a federal Europe, which was then developed concretely by the Schuman Declaration. Now, the war has also come back to Europe. The EU is a process of constant federalisation, with moments of stalling and moments of acceleration. If we look back to the Manifesto, some things have been achieved, like the common market and the euro. On the topic of a stronger European foreign and defence policy, we are still far off what Spinelli envisaged. In a hostile geopolitical world in which continental powers could dominate (China, Russia, US, India, Brazil, etc.), we need to be stronger and more united.

*Note: the Italian version of this interview was published in the 1 September print edition of Domani giornale.

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